

AUTHOR-PREPARED ENGLISH TRANSLATION

THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY: A PROCESS WITHOUT GENUINE CITIZENSHIP

Bernardo Gortaire Morejón

Bernardo ORCID 0000-0002-4794-3239

Universidad de las Américas, Ecuador

License. The original article and this translation are distributed under CC BY-NC 4.0. Attribution to the author and the journal's first publication must be retained; commercial use is not permitted.

Received October 31, 2016 | Accepted January 31, 2017

Abstract

The Andean Community faces an evident legitimacy crisis that may foreshadow its future collapse. Despite this, efforts to rescue the process appear limited, especially those emerging from civil society. This article explains the phenomenon through the apparent absence of a regional collective identity, questioning both the notion of an "Andean identity" and civil society's limited involvement in the Andean integration process.

Keywords Regionalism; South American regionalism; Andean Community; Regional integration; Identity; Civil society; Free trade; Collective identity; Barriers to integration; Mercosur.

Introduction

The Andean Community (CAN) is one of the oldest regional integration projects in the world, within the context of regional integration itself, which as such does not extend further back than the late 1940s. Born as the Andean Pact in 1969, with the signing of the Cartagena Agreement among Bolivia, Chile (which would withdraw in 1976), Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela (a member between 1973 and 2006), it aspired to "strengthen the union of its peoples and lay the groundwork for progress toward the formation of an Andean subregional community." With its ups and downs, the Andean Pact was a process that guided relations among the Pacific coast countries of South America from the late 1960s to the mid-1990s.¹

The Andean Pact was restructured in 1996, the year in which the CAN and the Andean Integration System (SAI) were established, granting the body a new legal and institutional framework projected toward a broader type of integration, one that would move beyond the economic-commercial approach with which it had operated until then. It seems, however, that this restructuring came too late, as confirmed by a 2013 reengineering effort that was "a reflection of the increasingly discordant views among member countries on development strategies, modes of insertion into the global economy, and the desired scope and depth of the integration process itself." This showed that the CAN was a project in which the member states had adopted internal processes that were too diverse, and where the communities that made them up had not been actively engaged enough to feel identified with the process.^{2, 3, 4}

This claim has been borne out by the various events that took place at the start of the twenty-first century, among them the adoption of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) by Colombia and Peru with the United States

in 2006, which broke with the customs union then taking shape among the Andean countries and further drove Venezuela's withdrawal from the CAN and its subsequent accession to the Southern Common Market (Mercosur). It is worth noting, on the other hand, that Bolivia's accession to Mercosur did not mean its exit from the Andean integration process, but rather raised a complex dilemma over dual membership; to which was added a possible withdrawal from the body by Ecuador, announced by President Rafael Correa. All of these elements show that the Andean Community is going through a prolonged period of instability and faces a possible collapse that threatens the loss of its much-proclaimed historical legacy.^{5, 6, 7}

Today, it is observable that many regional integration processes worldwide face crises of legitimacy and social disconnection due to a lack of engagement with various sectors of civil society, which raises the threat of a return to policies of national isolationism, in a bid to regain control over decision-making and the state's room to maneuver when establishing relations with other countries in terms of independence and autonomy. In this context, the CAN is no exception; while it is true that the Cartagena Agreement itself recognized, in its Article 129, the objective of "affirming cultural identity and building civic values for the integration of the Andean area," activity in the social field only began to be implemented in recent years.^{8, 9}

This factor, together with other variables, such as the advance of globalization, the acceleration of communications and exchanges with new state and non-state actors, changes in trade dynamics, the transnationalization of problems that were previously matters of concern to the nation-state alone, and the subsequent inability of the "Westphalian state" to respond to them, means that integration dynamics, adjusted strictly to the conditions of the last century, now appear obsolete, making it necessary to generate new mechanisms capable of including communities in integration processes, in order to build a sense of belonging that can drive those processes forward.¹⁰

This article seeks to explain how the lack of attention to social aspects, especially the identity factor, within the Andean integration process, has caused momentum for this project to arise only sporadically rather than steadily, and how this has contributed to the decline the CAN currently faces. Likewise, this analysis aims to raise awareness of the importance of implementing social policies accessible to the communities that are part of regional integration processes, and of how the building of a regional identity can serve as a fundamental engine for the consolidation of a successful and lasting integration.

To this end, the article is divided into three sections. The first traces the different projects that have been attempted in the social field of Andean integration. The second section then explains the limitations the CAN has faced and how these have undermined the process's progress, especially in the field of identity. Finally, the third section is devoted to setting out conclusions and possible recommendations in the field of South American integration.

Andean integration: the evolution of a desk-bound process

The evolution of Andean integration has been a process of highs and lows. At some moments member countries displayed strong interest, while at others indifference has been the process's defining feature. Germánico Salgado divides the process into four stages: the first spans the period from 1971 to 1975-1976, characterized as the Andean Pact's formative stage, marked by clear growth in intraregional trade and exports. This period also includes Venezuela's incorporation as a member. The second stage covers the period from 1976 to 1982 and stands out for a loss of momentum and growing questioning of the integration process, most notably Chile's withdrawal, as the country pushed for a neoliberal model driven by the Pinochet dictatorship. In this stage, integration achievements were modest, despite the incorporation of the Andean Parliament and the Andean Court of Justice, which would go on to strengthen the Andean Pact's institutional framework.¹¹

Between 1983 and 1986 comes what is referred to as the period of external crisis, during which integration and trade regressed, as intraregional exports fell from a peak of US \$1.263 billion in 1981 to just US \$621 million in 1986. This period also saw a series of breaches of agreements, which became chronic through the mechanisms of deferral and exemption that turned into a habitual practice among member states. In addition, neoliberalism came to influence the conception of integration, giving rise to what became known as "open regionalism (...) characterized by low levels of external protection, which would help maximize efficiency gains and mitigate the potential discriminatory effects of integration on non-members." This, however, made establishing a customs union more difficult.^{12, 13}

Finally, Salgado includes a period spanning from 1989 to 1998, known as the reactivation period, during which a restructuring process took place, grounded in the Trujillo Act, which hopefully drove forward a process of expanding the capacity of what was now the Andean Community, with a view to overcoming the limitations of being a purely commercial agreement and strengthening the integration process's supranational capacity.¹⁴

It is worth adding a fifth stage, and probably a sixth, to those set out by Salgado, in order to address the events that have taken place since the early twenty-first century, when integration came to be driven from a more South American than strictly Andean perspective. Proposals from the governments of Brazil and Venezuela led to the establishment of a new process seeking to include the whole of the South American region, one that was consolidated in the founding of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). This momentum, however, was not reflected within the CAN, despite the effort invested by the body's General Secretariat, since it was undercut by the signing of the Colombia-Peru FTA, Venezuela's withdrawal, and Bolivia's accession to Mercosur. The probable sixth stage could be dated from 2013, with the attempted reengineering that serves as a process of scaling back the CAN. This instability, however, is not merely a matter of the present juncture, but a structural problem tied to the very formation of Andean integration.¹⁵

When the Andean Pact was founded, the political and economic climate of the time favored the establishment of economic integration projects. The example of the European Communities exerted a

strong influence on the structuring of integration processes worldwide. The *spillover effect*, understood as a process in which integration begins in one specific sector and subsequently extends to others, was seen as a viable path toward broader integration. This is why Viner's and Balassa's staged approach to integration was understood as a valid resource, one that would favor the pursuit of trade among member states, with the aim of fostering development among the countries of the Andean region, which were seen as comparable in terms of development models and levels, in order to later work on other sectors such as the political or the social. It is worth noting that the vision of development at the time was tied strictly to economic growth, which gave the Andean Group an agenda favoring trade and industrialization, through strategies such as import substitution and industrial programming.¹⁶

The proposals set out for this group have been broad and fairly ambitious. The Andean countries had already gone through the integrationist experience of the Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC), and had accordingly discovered the different conditions prevailing across Latin America, along with the different speeds and models of development found among the region's more developed countries, such as Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina (the great beneficiaries of ALALC). In this context, the Andean Pact had the opportunity not only to expand intraregional trade among member countries, but also to strengthen industrialization capacities and subsequent insertion into the international market, which was to be achieved through the so-called Sectoral Programs for Industrial Development (PSDI).¹⁷

Added to this were preferential conditions for the countries of lesser relative development, such as Bolivia and Ecuador, which favored an equitable distribution of the benefits of integration, complemented by liberalization timelines designed to reduce the impact an excessive, unplanned liberalization might have had. In addition, all of these processes were intended solely for the Andean countries and directed by the Cartagena Agreement Board, which answered to the interests of the member countries in fulfilling the objectives that had been set.¹⁸

Despite the well-thought-out programming behind the Andean Pact's structure, the process lacked citizen validation, turning it into a desk-bound process. It should clearly be acknowledged that, for its time, this was an ambitious project that succeeded in demonstrating its validity through the growth of intraregional trade and through certain PSDIs that functioned effectively; civil society, however, was not an active player in the integration process, which was led mainly by Heads of State and Ministries of Trade, with occasional participation from the business sector and certain power groups, who saw in tariff liberalization a space for satisfying their own interests. It was not until the early twenty-first century, then, that the social agenda of Andean integration was established.¹⁹

One of the process's main shortcomings, then, was linked to the late entry into action of the Andean Parliament, whose Constitutive Treaty was signed in 1979, ten years after the signing of the Cartagena Agreement, and which entered into force only in 1984, fifteen years after the Andean integration process began. In other words, the Andean Pact's deliberative body did not play an active role in its integration during the most critical years of its formation. In 1996, however, it acquired new powers of action by becoming the SAI's Political Oversight body, and it attempted to break its isolation from the population with the signing of the Additional Protocol to the Constitutive Treaty on Direct and Universal Elections of

its Representatives. The Protocol sought to have Andean Parliamentarians chosen directly by the people, a process that likewise took time to implement and from which Colombia has exempted itself. We are speaking, then, of a body that for a long period remained cut off from civil society and the electorate. As a result, the community's reaction to the possible elimination of the Andean Parliament since 2013 has been scant or practically nonexistent.²⁰

This lack of engagement with the community reaffirms Germánico Salgado's argument that "there are no valid international instruments if the parties are not still convinced of their purposes and are not willing to abide by their rules"; for although an attempt was made to implement a democratizing mechanism that would bring decision-making closer to Andean citizens within the integration process, the process has been slow to implement and has struggled to take hold within the dynamic between national states and the supranational body. This process has nonetheless left clear lessons, not only for Andean integration, but for South American integration, which, within the framework of UNASUR, has moved toward implementing a South American Parliament that, building on the work of the Andean Parliament, could eventually consolidate itself as a legislative body for the entire region. What will matter in this case is the capacity to bring the electorate into decision-making more broadly, along with a greater capacity to track the process and proper accountability.^{21, 22, 23, 24}

Nor should other advances on the social front be dismissed, ones that may have contributed to the consolidation of an Andean identity. The decisions that reshaped the concept of Andean citizenship undoubtedly stand out, facilitating free movement among member countries through the recognition of national identity documents as valid in any CAN country, the establishment of an Andean passport, and the creation of a cooperation mechanism for consular assistance and protection and migration matters. However, although these decisions helped improve mobility and facilitate assistance to Andean nationals abroad, many of the benefits that citizens receive within their own states remain limited for citizens of other countries, thereby reducing the concept of Andean citizenship to a closed circle of concessions in the field of free movement, one that gains little ground in the individual national imagination.^{25, 26}

Another of the institutional efforts to build a CAN more oriented toward the social sphere was the establishment of the Integrated Social Development Plan (PIDS), which aims to "channel actions of subregional scope (activities, projects, and programs) that enrich and complement national policies for overcoming poverty and social inequity," and which is coordinated by the Andean Council of Social Development Ministers (CADS). Francisco Pareja acknowledges, however, that the PIDS has advanced slowly, and has also run into one of the most chronic problems affecting every Andean integration project: countries' lack of commitment when it comes to allocating the human and financial resources needed to carry out projects, thereby sustaining an "exclusively national vision of social policy."²⁷

On the other hand, some of the most significant advances in generating social development revolve around the Social Agreements, among them the Andrés Bello education agreement, the Hipólito Unanue health agreement, and the Simón Rodríguez labor agreement, with health being the area that has prevailed most, through the establishment of an Andean Health Body (ORAS-CONHU) that has extended beyond the

Andean space to include countries outside the CAN; the other agreements, however, have not shown the same solidity.²⁸

This problem recurs across these areas, since there is low social engagement with the projects, and therefore neither collective momentum nor tangible progress in the realities and successes that take shape within them. Finally, it is worth mentioning that attempts have been made to create spaces for dialogue and participation, but unfortunately these have not reached their expected impact. These spaces target specific sectors of the population, such as Indigenous peoples, Afro-descendant communities, young people, women, and entrepreneurs, among others, giving rise to several Advisory Councils. The problem they face would appear to be linked to a lack of state-level promotion of these initiatives, along with intangible funding that makes it impossible to cover the costs of consolidating solid, long-term projects.

As has been shown throughout this section, efforts in recent years to strengthen Andean integration's social agenda have been extensive, especially from the institutions that make up the CAN and the SAI. The limited engagement of the population of member states with these projects, however, greatly hampers the progress of any initiative, undermining this area's capacity for action and its effectiveness. This can be explained by the fact that social agendas are understood strictly through the lens of local politics, seeking to respond solely to the national electorate rather than to a transnational project, aligning with a civil society that has little interest in the pursuit of Andean objectives, given the lack of an identity tying communities together beyond their borders (border populations are probably an exception to this rule, given a notable effort to strengthen cross-border relations among CAN countries). The problem of the failure to consolidate an Andean identity will be analyzed in the following section, drawing on the *theory of identity-based integration*.²⁹

The Andean Community: A Process Without Identity

In 2008, a report by the Andean Community itself acknowledged that:

> Neither the economic benefits of Andean trade, nor the –still scarce– efforts at cooperation in the social field, nor the joint negotiation of international agreements, have proven sufficient to develop an integration process that would allow the Andean community institutions to adequately address citizens' expectations regarding human development, environmental protection and the effects of climate change, the reduction of poverty and social exclusion, the redistribution of wealth, food security, and the defense of these interests in the face of globalization.³⁰

This is without question a significant problem for integration, and one that must be treated as a top priority by political leaders and participants in the integration process, since in the absence of a community engaged with a process, there will be no driving force behind integration, and politics will remain stalled at the national level. In addition, the greatest obstacle does not lie in a lack of projects, which, as seen in the previous section, have been notable since the late twentieth century, but rather in the absent engagement of national societies with the regional stage through institutional channels (despite a

strong influence at the domestic level), and in the lack of communication that has limited the emergence of a sense of belonging to the "Andean," without a genuine identity ever taking shape. But why does identity matter so much in regional integration processes?

Identity itself is a term that has been widely used in integration discourse; however, given its origins in the field of economics, most efforts have been directed toward the commercial area. Identity has nonetheless gained significant relevance in the study of the Social Sciences since the 1980s, and in the field of International Relations since the growth of the constructivist school. In the same way, it is of considerable importance to strengthen the debate on identity in regional integration processes, since it fulfills several fundamental roles that reinforce regional integration.^{31, 32, 33}

Identity, understood beyond the reductionist notion that ties it strictly to culture, consists of "a system of symbols and values that makes it possible to face different everyday situations. It operates as a filter that helps decode them." Identity is a fundamental element in interpersonal relations, defining the individual, their interests, and the kind of relationship they will maintain with other individuals. Collective identity, for its part, is "a process through which actors produce the shared cognitive structures that allow them to assess their environment and calculate the costs and benefits of action. The definitions they formulate are, on the one hand, the result of negotiated interactions and relations of influence and, on the other, the fruit of emotional recognition." In the constitution of nation-states, the consolidation of a collective national identity is essential, one that allows for the establishment of symbols and values favoring the formation of shared norms that regulate relations among their members. In regional integration processes, however, attempts to establish these bonds and structures have been rather scarce.^{34, 35}

Collective identity means that the wellbeing of the referential "other" comes to be understood as general wellbeing; this "removes many of the barriers that set one apart from the other, generating a process of internalization in which the Other begins to be seen as part of the same group, giving rise to the notion of a *We*." At the state level, it can be understood that the benefits another state receives will not be seen as a loss for one's own state but rather, owing to a sense of community, will be understood as one's own. This is a process that has not taken place within Andean integration, since that perception of a shared "we" has never taken shape, which is why relations among CAN states remain largely competitive. It is worth stressing, however, that this is a peaceful competition with little likelihood of violent conflict, marking an effective achievement of Andean integration in consolidating the region as a zone of peace, despite the differences that existed in the past, especially between Ecuador and Peru.^{36, 37}

Despite the scarce efforts made to build regional collective identities, identity takes on several significant roles when it comes to establishing regional integration processes, among them: 1. The causal role of commitment, whereby a greater collective identity is understood to bring greater commitment to participating in the process, within a framework of trust that favors states ceding more room for cooperation; 2. The causal role of interest homogenization, leading states to pursue common goals and, in addition, to satisfy a greater share of the interests of the communities that are part of integration processes.

In addition, in the absence of a collective identity, individual identities will prevail, and states will accordingly be more concerned with responding to local needs than to regional ones; 3. The third role operates at the internal level of each state and is the domestic national role, which requires returning to the local level to determine whether there is a clear understanding of the state's own national identity, since if there is no clear, widely shared definition of that identity, the process of self-definition will most likely clash with the values being transnationalized. As a result, measures taken to strengthen the integration process at the social level will not find fertile ground, insofar as the formation of a national identity tends to be built on comparison with neighboring identities.

This is why it is so important to consider civil society's participation as active agents of integration, since its perception of the process gives that process its validity, and if its identity is tied to integration, the fruits of that integration will be far more visible. 4. Finally, and in an all-encompassing way, there is what is known as the integration-facilitating role, whereby some states find integration far easier than others, insofar as they hold identities that favor integration compared with others that maintain nationalist outlooks.³⁸

If we examine the case of Andean integration, it is apparent that these roles remain unfulfilled, largely due to a lack of commitment, exemplified by the series of exceptions taken by countries such as Peru and Colombia, suspending their trade obligations through safeguards or other protectionist measures. Diffuse interests favoring the prevalence of national interests have also been apparent, where the signing of extraregional agreements, which prompted Venezuela's withdrawal from the CAN, offers a clear picture of how the national prevails in the region's political agenda. In addition, civil society remains only loosely involved in the process and subject to shifts in the political agenda, with collectives, movements, and associations focused on solving local problems.³⁹

There are also identities that work against the consolidation of a supranational body, since they favor sovereignty as a fundamental concept, bearing out, in a way, what worried Ricardo Ffrench-Davis in the early years of Andean integration: "the originality of the Cartagena Agreement and the successes achieved are at risk to the extent that some governments relegate the Andean Pact to secondary consideration, owing to their countries' situational problems," and although this argument was conceived mainly within the economic-commercial framework, it turned out to be a harsh reality for the many facets that Andean integration went on to take up.⁴⁰

Dynamics to which the construction of Andean identity itself adds its semantic definition, in the sense that the label "Andean" can prove limiting to the geographic-cultural sense of the Andes mountain range and the traditional cultures that inhabit it. Within this framework, the Andean Community faces the problem that its member states have a diverse geography extending well beyond the Andean mountain chain, which means the concept of "Andean" tends to exclude other regions, something clearly seen in the case of Ecuador, where the Coast, Amazon, and Insular regions retain identity traits that set them apart from the Andean Highlands region. At the same time, this identity has not been successfully consolidated with other countries that are part of the Andean region, such as Venezuela (which left the process) and Chile and Argentina (which are only associate members). There is, however, also a curious cultural construction

of the "Andean" outside the region itself: for migrant populations from Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador, the "Andean" serves as a reference to the homeland and has functioned as a cultural bond in foreign countries; this construction is not entirely inclusive, but it is a variable that integration leaders should take into account when building a regional collective identity that transcends national identities.^{41, 42, 43}

The proposal to build an Andean identity rests on "the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, one that respects the cultural diversity of peoples while also reinforcing a sense of belonging not only to an Andean state but to a Community with shared values and interests." At the national level, however, there are several sectors that have a negative impact on the consolidation of this regional identity. These actors have been active participants in the formation of national identity and play a significant role in shaping political agendas, steering debate toward certain issues over others. In this scenario we find the economic power groups and the media.⁴⁴

When we refer to economic power groups, we mean national business groups with oligopolistic characteristics that hold all or most of the market for one or several products and services, and that wield political or economic influence over the state's decision-making networks. These groups have taken on an ambivalent role in integration, since they have promoted it by demanding greater ease for exporting or importing goods useful to their production chains. At the same time, however, they have opposed the advance of market liberalization, demanding greater protection for sectors they consider vulnerable. This is largely due to the low diversification of Andean production, which, given similar geography, climate, and resources, has developed rent-seeking production systems with little investment in industrialization and heavy dependence on primary sectors, despite the CAN's efforts to reduce that dependence. Small and medium producers have joined this struggle as well, seeing integration as a risk to their businesses and consequently calling for protectionist systems at the regional level.

Added to these barriers is the media's lack of engagement with the integration process. The Andean region lacks a regional media outlet that effectively promotes progress in its integration process; on the contrary, the media have created obstacles by promoting nationalist coverage, within a local agenda that pays little attention to the transnational. The path toward the ideological construction of an Andean "we" is cut short by a series of nationalist imaginaries that fail to recognize other members of the Andean process as part of the same group, seeing them instead as an "other," with different values and interests that work against one's own. It is not unusual in everyday life to come across news items about the problems that a rise in production in a neighboring country, or an increase in migration rates, poses for an Andean country, among other analyses in which the rest of the CAN's countries and their citizens are not seen as Andean citizens, as the organization has intended.

The dynamics of these sectors add to the isolation of decision-making at the level of political elites who, affected by the endemic ills of Latin American politics (corruption, nepotism, weak institutions, dependency, caudillismo, and clientelism), prove unable to engage civil society positively in the process or to build an identity capable of driving Andean integration forward. As a result, the failure to form a conception of "we" as an Andean Community hampers the strengthening of the regional integration

process and has robbed it of the momentum it needs for civil society itself to drive the pursuit of more ambitious, effective objectives.

Andean integration's dependence on political will has produced uneven progress that, although it has had significant effects in strengthening relations among its member countries, especially in the trade sphere, has left Andean integration unable to take medium- and long-term measures, since countries' agendas shifted along with changes of national government. This shortcoming is a structural, endemic ill of Latin American politics that has turned regional relations into cyclical processes that adapt to swings of the national political pendulum, such that at times there has been the momentum needed to strengthen integration, and at others a period of indifference, owing to a nationalist outlook or the pursuit of agreements with countries outside the region. The absence of a consolidated Andean identity contributes to this kind of process occurring, in a context where there is no civil society active enough to push its leaders to stay the course of integration.

Conclusions: The Future of Integration in the Region

The proposal for an Andean citizenship, "active, based on political and civic participation, one that safeguards a set of freedoms, rights, and guarantees that add to and confer added value on national citizenships," will only become attainable once the barriers imposed by the nation-states themselves are overcome. At present, this possibility seems distant; there is even talk of the Andean Community's effective collapse in the face of its institutional dismantling, which would put the consolidation of a genuine Andean citizenship out of reach. Nevertheless, the states still part of this process must be able to draw the lessons of Andean integration into other regional processes and, above all, must be able to learn from past mistakes, especially in the social field.^{45, 46}

As has been observed throughout this article, the CAN has been unable to work efficiently in the social field, and although it is clear that this shortcoming has not stemmed from a lack of effort on the part of the body's institutions, it can be noted that the incorporation of the social agenda and of channels for citizen participation came late in the history of Andean integration. This may be explained by the fact that integration is itself a revolutionary process within the field of international relations, one in which learning, error correction, and the incorporation of new issues have had to happen along the way. This, however, does not excuse the failure to translate efficiently into practice the discursive rhetoric that political leaders have relied on when speaking of integration in the region, nor the lack of commitment when it comes to taking the steps needed to achieve more solid levels of integration.

Globalization itself appears to have affected the very conception of the region as such; what once seemed to be understood as a region in its own right now seems to be understood as a subregion within South America, bearing out the idea that "there are no natural or given regions." This same idea shows that there remains a possibility the Andean region could once again become a key piece of regional politics in the future, which is why ruling out its validity altogether would carry considerable weight. Nevertheless, the participation of Colombia and Peru in processes such as the Pacific Alliance, the incorporation of Bolivia

and Venezuela into Mercosur, and the emergence of new regional cooperation mechanisms such as UNASUR and CELAC, in which all Andean countries hold membership, shows that the "Andean" has, for the time being, been relegated to the background.⁴⁷

The case of the Andean Community is a clear example of how a process that fails to generate its own identity, by not engaging civil society, loses a key source of momentum. Because the community was never integrated into the Andean integration project, national identities have prevailed over a conception of transnational collective benefit, which is why the costs of decisions taken outside the CAN, such as signing agreements with countries outside the region, adopting protectionist measures, or even leaving the process altogether, carry so little weight within society. This would also explain why there have been so many unfinished integration projects in the region, even though each has made its own respective progress. Each process, then, is understood to hold its own identity, without changing the identity of the nation-states themselves, which, once the initial momentum of the integration process fades, return to a cycle of struggle over national interests.

Discursive promises and the signing of treaties cannot be the sole source of sustenance for integration, especially within societies where civil society participation is becoming ever more important on the national stage. If democracy is the system of government that Latin American countries seek to defend, it must not be confined to national borders but must become transnational. For this process to be effectively fulfilled, it will be essential that the social agenda become a matter for the community, rather than a domain exclusive to the state, and, above all, that work be done toward consolidating a regional collective identity capable of motivating communities and their leaders to strengthen the integration process and set aside national self-interest in favor of a common good.

Notes

1. CAN, *Acuerdo de Cartagena*, (Colombia, May 26, 1969), 1
(<http://www19.iadb.org/int/intradebid/DocsPdf/Acuerdos/CANDINA%20-%20Acuerdo%20de%20Cartagena%20Decision%20563.pdf>).
2. CAN, *Acta de Trujillo*, (Peru, March 10, 1996) (<http://www.comunidadandina.org/documentos/actas/act10-3-96.htm>).
3. CAN, "Decisión 792: Implementación de la Reingeniería del Sistema Andino de Integración," *Comunidad Andina*, 2013, intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/decisiones/DEC810.doc.
4. Francisco Pareja, "Integración andina y convergencia suramericana," *Análisis Económico*, No. 25 (2013): 350.
5. Ibid.
6. Adalid Contreras, "Estrategias," in Alberto Adrianzén, ed., *Convergencia CAN-MERCOSUR la hora de las definiciones*, (Quito: Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Ecuador Campus/Corporación Editora Nacional, 2014).
7. "Ecuador evaluará continuidad en la CAN ante desbalance comercial," *El Universo*, July 9, 2016.
(<http://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2016/07/09/nota/5680458/ecuador-evaluara-continuidad-can-ante-desbalance-comercial>).
8. CAN, *Acuerdo de Cartagena*, art. 129, (Colombia, May 26, 1969): 1.

9. Walter Varillas, "Perspectiva social: identificación de nuevas áreas, temas o proyectos con perspectivas favorables," in Alberto Adrianzén, ed., *Convergencia CAN-MERCOSUR. La hora de las definiciones*. (Quito: Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Ecuador Campus/Corporación Editora Nacional, 2014).
10. Ariel François, *El crepúsculo del Estado-Nación. Una interpretación histórica en el contexto de la globalización* (Paris: UNESCO, 2000) (<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001204/120486So.pdf>).
11. Germánico Salgado, *El Grupo Andino Eslabón hacia la integración de Sudamérica*, 2nd ed. (Quito: Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Ecuador Campus/Corporación Editora Nacional, 2007), 22-30.
12. José Antonio Sanahuja, "Regionalismo e integración en América Latina: balance y perspectivas," *Pensamiento iberoamericano*, No. 0: 75-106. Quito: AECID/Fundación Carolina (2007): 77.
13. Germánico Salgado, "El Grupo Andino. Eslabón hacia la integración de Sudamérica," 2007.
14. Daniela Perrotta, "La integración regional como objeto de estudio. De las teorías tradicionales a los enfoques actuales," *Relaciones Internacionales. Teorías y Debates* (2013): 197-252.
(https://scholar.google.es/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=es&user=yqj1RPIAAAAJ&citation_for_view=yqj1RPIAAAAJ:IjCSPb-OG4C).
15. Francisco Pareja, "La dimensión social de la integración andina." *Revista de la integración, 40 años de la integración andina avances y perspectivas*, No. 4, (2009): 147-59.
16. Germánico Salgado, "El Grupo Andino. Eslabón hacia la integración de Sudamérica," 2007.
17. Francisco Pareja, "La dimensión social de la integración andina," 2009.
18. Parlamento Andino, *Historia*, (2015) (<http://www.parlamentoandino.org/index.php/acerca-de/historia>).
19. CAN, *Una Comunidad Andina para los ciudadanos un proyecto para la integración integral de nuestros pueblos*, (2008) (<http://www.comunidadandina.org/documentos/docIA/unaCANparaCIUDADANOS.pdf>).
20. Germánico Salgado, "El Grupo Andino. Eslabón hacia la integración de Sudamérica" (2007): 19.
21. CAN, "Decisión 503: Reconocimiento de documentos Nacionales de Identificación," *Comunidad Andina*, 2001, <http://intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/decisiones/DEC503.doc>; CAN, "Decisión 504: Creación del Pasaporte Andino," *Comunidad Andina*, 2001.
(<http://intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/decisiones/DEC504.doc>).
22. CAN, "Decisión 526: Ventanillas de Entrada en Aeropuertos para Nacionales y Extranjeros Residentes en los Países Miembros," *Comunidad Andina*, 2002., (<http://intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/decisiones/DEC526.doc>).
23. CAN, "Decisión 548: Mecanismo Andino de cooperación en materia de asistencia y protección consular y asuntos migratorios," *Comunidad Andina*, 2003, <http://intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/decisiones/DEC548.doc>; CAN, "Decisión 583: Sustitución de la decisión 546, Instrumento Andino de Seguridad Social," *Comunidad Andina*, 2004, <http://intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/decisiones/DEC583.doc>.
24. CAN, "Decisión 601: Plan Integrado de Desarrollo Social," *Comunidad Andina*, 2004,
(<http://intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/decisiones/DEC601.doc>).
25. Walter Varillas, "Perspectiva social: identificación de nuevas áreas, temas o proyectos con perspectivas favorables" (2014): 74.
26. Francisco Pareja, "La dimensión social de la integración andina." (2009): 156.
27. Walter Varillas, "Perspectiva social: identificación de nuevas áreas, temas o proyectos con perspectivas favorables," 2014.
28. Francisco Pareja, "La dimensión social de la integración andina." (2009): 147-59.

29. Bernardo Gortaire Morejón, "La identidad como sustento para la integración regional: teoría de la integración identitaria" (undergraduate thesis, Universidad de las Américas, Ecuador, 2016).
30. CAN, *Una Comunidad Andina para los ciudadanos un proyecto para la integración integral de nuestros pueblos*, (2008): 4.
31. Bernardo Gortaire Morejón, "La identidad como sustento para la integración regional: teoría de la integración identitaria," 2016.
32. Gilberto Giménez, *La cultura como identidad y la identidad como cultura*. (Mexico City: Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales de la UNAM, 2005).
33. Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*. (London: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
34. Secretaría de Estado para la Cooperación al Desarrollo de Bélgica, "El concepto de identidad," *Vivre ensemble autrement*, (2002).
35. Alberto Melucci, *Acción colectiva, vida cotidiana y democracia* (Mexico City: Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales de la UNAM, 1999), 66.
(http://www.ses.unam.mx/docencia/2016II/Melucci1999_AccionColectivaVidaCotidianaYDemocracia.pdf).
36. Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 2003.
37. Bernardo Gortaire Morejón, "La identidad como sustento para la integración regional: teoría de la integración identitaria" (2016): 27.
38. Bernardo Gortaire Morejón, "La identidad como sustento para la integración regional: teoría de la integración identitaria," 2016.
39. Germánico Salgado, "El Grupo Andino. Eslabón hacia la integración de Sudamérica," 2007.
40. Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, "El Pacto Andino: Un modelo original de integración," *El trimestre económico* 43, No. 170 (1976): 319.
41. Ariruma Kowii, comp., *Identidad lingüística de los pueblos indígenas de la Región Andina*. (Quito: Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Ecuador Campus/Abya-Yala/Instituto Ítalo-Latino Americano, 2005).
42. Jorge Enrique Adoum, *Ecuador: señas particulares*, 3rd ed. (Quito: Eskeletra, 1998).
43. Ulises Zevallos-Aguilar, "Memoria y discursos de identidad andina en los Estados Unidos," *Revista Iberoamericana* 73, No. 220 (2007): 649-64. (<http://revista-iberoamericana.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/Iberoamericana/article/viewFile/5349/5506>).
44. CAN, *Una Comunidad Andina para los ciudadanos un proyecto para la integración integral de nuestros pueblos* (2008): 4. (<http://www.comunidadandina.org/documentos/docIA/unaCANparaCIUDADANOS.pdf>).
45. Ibid.
46. Francisco Pareja, "Integración andina y convergencia suramericana," 2013.
47. Bjorn Hettne and Frederik Söderbaum, "Theorizing the Rise of Regionness." *New Political Economy* 5, No. 3 (2000).

References

- Adoum, Jorge Enrique. *Ecuador: señas particulares*. 3rd ed. Quito: Eskeletra, 1998.
- CAN. *Acta de Trujillo*. Peru, March 10, 1996. <http://www.comunidadandina.org/documentos/actas/act10-3-96.htm>.

CAN. *Acuerdo de Cartagena*. Colombia, May 26, 1969.

<http://www19.iadb.org/int/intradebid/DocsPdf/Acuerdos/CANDINA%20-%20Acuerdo%20de%20Cartagena%20Decision%20563.pdf>.

CAN. “Decisión 503: Reconocimiento de documentos Nacionales de Identificación.” *Comunidad Andina*, 2001.

<http://intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/decisiones/DEC503.doc>.

CAN. “Decisión 504: Creación del Pasaporte Andino.” *Comunidad Andina*, 2001.

<http://intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/decisiones/DEC504.doc>.

CAN. “Decisión 526: Ventanillas de Entrada en Aeropuertos para Nacionales y Extranjeros Residentes en los Países Miembros.” *Comunidad Andina*, 2002. <http://intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/decisiones/DEC526.doc>.

CAN. “Decisión 548: Mecanismo Andino de cooperación en materia de asistencia y protección consular y asuntos migratorios.” *Comunidad Andina*, 2003. <http://intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/decisiones/DEC548.doc>.

CAN. “Decisión 583: Sustitución de la decisión 546, Instrumento Andino de Seguridad Social.” *Comunidad Andina*, 2004. <http://intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/decisiones/DEC583.doc>.

CAN. “Decisión 601: Plan Integrado de Desarrollo Social.” *Comunidad Andina*, 2004.

<http://intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/decisiones/DEC601.doc>.

CAN. “Decisión 792: Implementación de la Reingeniería del Sistema Andino de Integración.” *Comunidad Andina*, 2013. intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/decisiones/DEC810.doc.

CAN. *Una Comunidad Andina para los ciudadanos: un proyecto para la integración integral de nuestros pueblos*. 2008. <http://www.comunidadandina.org/documentos/docIA/unaCANparaCIUDADANOS.pdf>.

Contreras, Adalid. “Estrategias.” In Alberto Adrianzén, ed., *Convergencia CAN-MERCOSUR: La hora de las definiciones*, 101–36. Quito: Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Sede Ecuador/Corporación Editora Nacional, 2014.

El Comercio. “Ecuador evaluará continuidad en la CAN ante desbalance comercial.” July 9, 2016.

<http://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2016/07/09/nota/5680458/ecuador-evaluara-continuidad-can-ante-desbalance-comercial>.

Ffrench-Davis, Ricardo. “El Pacto Andino: Un modelo original de integración.” *El Trimestre Económico* 43, no. 170 (1976): 297–320.

Français, Ariel. *El crepúsculo del Estado-Nación: Una interpretación histórica en el contexto de la globalización*. Paris: UNESCO, 2000. <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001204/120486So.pdf>.

Giménez, Gilberto. *La cultura como identidad y la identidad como cultura*. Mexico City: Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales de la UNAM, 2005.

Gortaire Morejón, Bernardo. “La identidad como sustento para la integración regional: teoría de la integración identitaria.” Undergraduate thesis, Universidad de las Américas, Ecuador, 2016.

Hettne, Bjorn, and Fredrik Söderbaum. “Theorizing the Rise of Regionness.” *New Political Economy* 5, no. 3 (2000): 457–73.

Kowii, Ariruma, comp. *Identidad lingüística de los pueblos indígenas de la Región Andina*. Quito: Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Sede Ecuador/Abya-Yala/Instituto Ítalo-Latino Americano, 2005.

Melucci, Alberto. *Acción colectiva, vida cotidiana y democracia*. Mexico City: Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales de la UNAM, 1999.

http://www.ses.unam.mx/docencia/2016II/Melucci1999_AccionColectivaVidaCotidianaYDemocracia.pdf.

- Pareja, Francisco. “La dimensión social de la integración andina.” *Revista de la Integración: 40 años de la integración andina, avances y perspectivas*, no. 4 (2009): 147–59.
- Pareja, Francisco. “Integración andina y convergencia suramericana.” *Análisis Económico*, no. 25 (2013): 349–70.
- Parlamento Andino. *Historia*. 2015. <http://www.parlamentoandino.org/index.php/acerca-de/historia>.
- Perrotta, Daniela. “La integración regional como objeto de estudio: De las teorías tradicionales a los enfoques actuales.” *Relaciones Internacionales: Teorías y debates* (2013): 197–252.
https://www.academia.edu/4279760/La_integraci%C3%B3n_regional_como_objeto_de_estudio._De_las_teor%C3%ADas_tradicionales_a_los_enfoques_actuales.
- Salgado, Germánico. *El Grupo Andino: Eslabón hacia la integración de Sudamérica*. 2nd ed. Quito: Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Sede Ecuador/Corporación Editora Nacional, 2007.
- Sanahuja, José Antonio. “Regionalismo e integración en América Latina: balance y perspectivas.” *Pensamiento Iberoamericano*, no. 0 (2007): 75–106.
- Secretaría de Estado para la Cooperación al Desarrollo de Bélgica. “El concepto de identidad.” *Vivre ensemble autrement*, 2002. <http://www.fuhem.es/ecosocial/dossier-intercultural/contenido/9%20EL%20CONCEPTO%20DE%20IDENTIDAD.pdf>.
- Varillas, Walter. “Perspectiva social: identificación de nuevas áreas, temas o proyectos con perspectivas favorables.” In Alberto Adrianzén, ed., *Convergencia CAN-MERCOSUR: La hora de las definiciones*. Quito: Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Sede Ecuador/Corporación Editora Nacional, 2014.
- Wendt, Alexander. *Social Theory of International Politics*. London: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Zevallos-Aguilar, Ulises. “Memoria y discursos de identidad andina en los Estados Unidos.” *Revista Iberoamericana* 73, no. 220 (2007): 649–64. <http://revista-iberoamericana.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/Iberoamericana/article/viewFile/5349/5506>.

Original title	La Comunidad Andina: un proceso sin ciudadanía real
Journal	Comentario Internacional, no. 16 (2016), pp. 89–110; published online October 10, 2018
DOI	https://doi.org/10.32719/26312549.2016.16.4
Version of record	Spanish
License	Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)
Translation	Bernardo Gortaire-Morejón, with assistance from OpenAI GPT-5.6 Sol

Publication notice

Status. The Spanish-language publication is the version of record. The underlying article was reviewed and published by Comentario Internacional. This English translation was not edited, reviewed, or endorsed by the journal. In the event of any discrepancy, readers should consult the Spanish version of record.

Translation disclosure. The English translation was prepared by Bernardo Gortaire-Morejón with assistance from the OpenAI GPT-5.6 Sol model. Responsibility for the final wording rests with the translator.

Faithfulness. The article has been translated from Spanish into English without substantive additions, corrections, or updates.